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Abstract 
 
The continued integration of technology into all 
aspects of society stresses the need to identify and 
understand the risk associated with assimilating new 
technologies. This necessity is heightened when 
technology is used for medical purposes like 
ambulatory devices that monitor a patient’s vital signs. 
This integration creates environments that are 
conducive to malicious activities. The potential impact 
presents new challenges for the medical community. 
Hence, this research presents attack graph 
modeling as a viable solution to identifying 
vulnerabilities, assessing risk, and forming mitigation 
strategies to defend ambulatory medical devices from 
attackers. Common and frequent vulnerabilities and 
attack strategies related to the various aspects of 
ambulatory devices, including Bluetooth enabled 
sensors and Android applications are identified in the 
literature. Based on this analysis, this research 
presents an attack graph modeling example on a 
theoretical device that highlights vulnerabilities and 
mitigation strategies to consider when designing 
ambulatory devices with similar components.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The assimilation of technology into medical related 
devices is continuing to escalate in today’s networked 
environments. This integration is blatantly visible in 
Ambulatory Medical Devices (AMDs) and Implantable 
Medical Devices (IMDs). Patients are able to wear 
AMDs that can monitor Electrocardiogram (EKG) data 
to detect arrhythmia, monitor blood glucose levels, 
administer insulin, and wear pulse oximeters that 
continuously monitors blood oxygen saturation in real 
time [40, 55, 56]. Not only does this emerging frontier, 
potentially, improve the safety and well-being of 
patients; it also provides a continuous source of data 
for healthcare practitioners to utilize when they are 
studying associated disorders. 
IMDs, such as infusion pumps, dispense controlled 
volumes of a drug (e.g. insulin or pain medicine) when 
it is required by the patient. These implantable drug-
delivery systems provide a viable method for achieving 
remedial drug concentrations in order to enhance 
patient welfare throughout treatment [23]. Another 
type of implantable medical device is a pacemaker. 
Pacemakers are placed under the skin near the heart to 
stimulate heartbeats [2]. 
The continued integration of technology into 
medical devices stresses the need to identify and 
understand the risk associated with assimilating new 
technologies. Not only do AMDs and IMDs present a 
physiological risk to the patients who use the device, 
but it also presents liability risk to practitioners and 
businesses who are monitoring and interpreting the 
data produced by these devices [36]. Environmental 
issues that increase the risks associated with AMDs 
and IMDs, when compared to traditional medical 
devices include accessibility and data transmission 
modes but these devices are accessible by the patient 
and the general population while they are in use in 
everyday activities. In other words, there is no physical 
tampering restriction imposed by the medical provider, 
like hospital staff, when these devices are used.  
From a data transmission perspective, most 
communication to and from the device is achieved via 
a wireless connection by a practitioner who may or 
may not be in the same location as the device. The type 
of transmission will vary depending on the solution 
implemented by the device manufacturer. Some 
ambulatory devices require a period of data storage, 
followed by a data upload, while other devices feed a 
constant stream of data to a storage device while it is in 
use [44, 50, 51]. These characteristics present 
opportunities to attackers that are not present in 
traditional medical devices. Therefore, ambulatory 
devices should be assessed and modeled independently 
of the traditional devices and traditional risk models.  
From a risk perspective, many risk models have 
been proposed, investigated and implemented into the 
health care industry. A few of the traditional models 
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that are commonly discussed include: Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) [4], A Risk Management 
Capability Model for Use in Medical Device 
Companies [46], and CORAS [43]. However, these 
models fail to provide concise insight into AMD 
susceptibility.  
The reality is that coupling environmental variable 
with multiple impact targets creates environments for 
AMDs and IMDs that entice plausible malicious 
activities in the areas of data exfiltration, data 
manipulation, and/or device operation modifications. 
Hence, this research focuses on adversaries who 
intentionally attempt to gain unauthorized access to a 
device for nefarious reasons. In doing so, this research 
investigates the implementation and use of attack 
graphs as a viable vehicle for investigating this risk 
associated with AMDs.  
Attack graphs are representations that provide a 
means of analyzing the susceptibility of a system. 
These graphs present vulnerabilities, exploits, and 
conditions for multiple attacks in a single consolidated 
model that allows for a quantitative examination of 
each individual attack [7]. A benefit of a graph based 
model is that it presents a rich view of how 
vulnerabilities relate to each other. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section two 
investigates the current use of ambulatory devices, as 
well as their vulnerabilities, risk models, and 
mitigation strategies. The review of the literature also 
examines the state of the art in attack graphs and graph 
modeling. Section three discusses the data sets used for 
the analysis and section four presents the construction 
of attack graphs and identification of mitigation 
strategies. Section five elicits conclusions from the 
analysis and presents future work. 
 
2. Relevant Work 
 
The continued integration of technology into the 
medical arena has fueled research interest in industry 
and academia. As this proliferation continues, it can be 
reasoned that the amount of risk increases due to an 
increasing attack surface and the introduction of new 
technology. Recent research indicates that residual data 
extracted from mobile devices is having an increasing 
impact in legal environments [3, 16]. The escalating 
amalgamation of ambulatory medical devices into the 
healthcare industry forces a need to understand the risk 
that these devices present to organizations. 
 
2.1. Attack Graph Models 
 
There are a number of different styles of attack 
graphs. A very popular attack graph is the attack tree. 
In general, attack trees are directed and acyclic graphs. 
They express how a specific sequence of attack steps 
can lead to a system breach. The root node of an attack 
tree represents the goal of the attacker, and the 
branches in the tree show the different paths to achieve 
the goal. The steps to achieve the attack are 
represented by leaves [2]. Once the graph is built, the 
probability of achieving an attack can be assigned to 
nodes or links, and the overall probability of reaching 
the goal can be found. Attack trees can assess risk to 
static probabilistic models, time dependent dynamic 
models, or both [2]. Using the assigned probabilities, 
the paths with the highest expectation of success can be 
identified and mitigation strategies can be considered.  
Attack trees have been used in a variety of fields to 
represent security risk and vulnerabilities. The term 
attack tree was first popularized by Bruce Schneier 
[53]. They are graphs such that nodes depict attacks 
and links depict the steps to the goal. The root node is 
considered to be the goal of the attacker and children 
of the root are steps needed to achieve this goal. The 
leafs of the attack tree represent attacks that can no 
longer be cultivated [48]. Notable application of graph-
based attack models include security analysis of 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, voting systems, vehicular communication 
systems, Internet related attacks, and secure software 
engineering  [9].  
Alhomidi and Reed [7] used attack graph modeling 
combined with genetic algorithms to identify the most 
important security threats on a network. Chen [42] 
presented a value driven approach to threat modeling 
based on attack path analysis by introducing 
stakeholder incentives into commercial off-the-shelf, 
product vulnerability prioritization.  
Kotenko and Chechulin [15] note the major 
drawback of large attack graphs is computational 
complexity, and described attack modeling and impact 
assessment solutions focused on development of attack 
graph construction and analysis for systems operating 
in near real-time. Phillips and Swiler [54] state a 
network-vulnerability risk identification system should 
be capable of modeling the dynamic conditions of a 
network. These conditions include the ability of the 
attacker, concurrent events or attacks, user access 
controls, and the sequences of attacks that depend on 
time. Their method uses graph algorithms such as 
shortest-path to recognize the attack paths with the 
highest risk.   
Louthan et al. [10] describe an approach to 
modeling hybrid systems, such as programmed control 
systems and cyber physical systems, that interact with 
the physical world. Their method used what they term 
a hybrid attack graph. The hybrid attack graph shows a 
combined prospective of the space between 
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information systems and a restricted but useful set of 
hybrid systems that are at risk. Florian et al. [2] state 
the assets and amount of time  available to the attacker 
and the stepwise execution of complementary attack 
steps are the central aspects for an attacker in a 
sophisticated attack. Based on these observations, their 
paper extends dynamic attack tree models using the 
ordered parallel behavior of AND-and OR-gates. Vigo 
et al. [14] proposed an automated attack tree generator 
using a static analysis approach. The attack trees are 
automatically inferred from a process of algebraic 
specification and Satisfiability Modulo Theories in a 
syntax-directed fashion while avoiding exponential 
explosion. Their case study used the standard 
propositional denotation of an attack tree to phrase 
quantitative problems.  
Piètre-Cambacédès et al. [33] note that attack trees 
are intrinsically static and limited to events that occur 
independently of each other. They suggest a similar 
structure based on Boolean logic Driven Markov 
Processes. This is similar to attack tree models but 
avoid combinatorial explosions. Roy et al. [34] 
presented a novel attack tree they refer to as attack 
countermeasure trees. In their model, defense measures 
can be posed not only at the leaves of a tree, but any 
node of the tree. Kordy et al. [31] demonstrated the 
similarities between attack trees and game theory. 
They showed attack–defense trees and binary zero-sum 
two-player extensive form games have proportionate 
expressive power such that they can be transformed 
into one another and still preserve the result and 
architecture.  
Attack-defense trees are extensions of attack trees. 
An attack-defense tree has the same attributes as an 
attack tree, but also contains defense strategies. Nodes 
are given characteristics, such as probability, impact, 
and penalty. This is done in order to enhance the 
expressive capability of the model. The values of the 
characteristics are determined based on cognitive 
assessment and historical events [19].  
Kordy et al. [22] compared the computational 
complexity of attack trees versus attack-defense trees. 
They identified rules for which extending attack trees 
did not increase computational complexity. Bagnato et 
al. [19] also used attack-defense trees, which focus on 
how attackers and defenders relate, to identify risk to 
an RFID system in a case study. Based on their model, 
they were able to identify guidelines to adhere to when 
using similar strategies. 
 
2.2 Risks for Medical Devices 
 
There has also been considerable research in the risk 
associated with medical devices posed by attackers. 
Among such devices are implantable medical devices. 
These devices have become increasingly popular and 
many are equipped with wireless communications 
which make them prime targets for attackers [32]. In 
the article, Researchers fight to keep implanted 
medical devices safe from hackers, Leavitt [32]  notes 
that over two million people in the US have an 
implantable medical device. Many of these devices 
communicate using wireless capability. Also noted in 
the article were the researchers from Harvard 
University, University of Massachusetts Amherst, and 
University of Washington who were able to hijack the 
short-range signals that an implantable cardiac 
defibrillator sent to a legitimate independent controller 
and caused it to emit a shock capable of inducing a 
fatal heart rhythm [32].   
     Arney et al. [26] state that adversaries who attack 
medical devices can be classified into two categories, 
active and passive. Active adversaries have the ability 
to spy on communications among devices, network 
controllers and supervisors. They are then able to insert 
messages, spoof, and damage the integrity of the 
device. The second type of adversaries, passive, 
eavesdrop for the purposes of acquiring private data 
stored in a device.  They also note four  classes  of  
targets  that adversaries attack  within  medical  device  
systems: patient  physical  security,  patient  data  
security (privacy),  medical  device  physical  security, 
and data security of the health-care institution that 
deploys the device [26].  
 
Table 1. IEEE 802.15.6 Communication [38] 
Implant to Implant 402-405 MHz 
Implant to Body 
Surface 
402-405 MHz 
Implant to External 402-405 MHz 
Body Surface to Body 
Surface (LOS) 
13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900 
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6 
GHz 
Body Surface to Body 
Surface (NLOS) 
13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900 
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6 
GHz 
Body Surface to 
External (LOS) 
13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900 
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6 
GHz 
Body Surface to 
External (NLOS) 
13.5, 50, 400, 600, 900 
MHz, 2.4, 3.1 - 10.6 
GHz 
 
     Burleson et al. [20] note that threat modeling is vital 
to assessing the security vulnerabilities to medical 
devices, and the risk posed by the vulnerabilities varies 
along with the nature of the data or the ramification of 
actuation. Radcliffe [39] was able to reverse engineer 
an insulin pump’s packet structure. His research 
showed the insulin pump did not encrypt the medical 
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data it transmitted and did not authenticate the 
components that were communicating. Li [27] was 
able to take control of an insulin pump, including the 
ability to terminate transmission of insulin or inject 
large amounts of insulin, and suggested mitigation 
strategies using rolling-code cryptographic protocols 
and body-coupled communication.  
     Xu [5] created an automated attack trees generator 
for implantable medical devices using process 
modeling and hazard analysis. He also demonstrated its 
use on Patient Controlled Analgesia, which is used for 
delivering pain medication to patients in hospitals. 
Rushanan and Kune [12]note the security of the 
telemetry interface on implantable medical devices has 
received much attention in the academic community, 
but the risk of software exploitation and the sensor 
interface layer requires further research.  Rostami et al. 
[18] describe the challenge in securing medical 
devices, including inability to use common approaches 
such as passwords and certificates because 
practitioners would not have access to the device in an 
emergency setting, and implantable medical devices 
are limited in power consumption and computational 
capability, which limits security strategies. As stated, 
the intention of their paper was to stimulate further 
research in the areas of implantable medical device 
security and medical-device security in general. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical Network 
 
2.3 Wireless Body Area Network  
 
Ambulatory devices can be a single unit that may 
or may not transmit data, or they can be one of many 
devices that make up a wireless body area network 
(WBAN). Body area networks are localized wireless 
networks that have the ability to support a wide variety 
of medical devices [28]. A wireless body area network 
can consist of devices to monitor physiological data, 
devices to display collected data, devices to perform 
calculations, devices to administer medication, and 
devices to store the collected data. IEEE 802.15 is 
concerned with the development of agreeable standards 
for Personal Area Networks or short distance wireless 
networks. It addresses wireless networking of 
ambulatory computing devices such as PCs, cell 
phones, and consumer electronics [18]. The IEEE 
standard 802.15.6 is the latest standard for wireless 
body area networks. This standard specifies short range 
wireless communication inside or on the human body 
[28]. However, several security problems have been 
noted [4], and communication can be achieved in a 
variety of ways, including ZigBee, Bluetooth, internet, 
WIMAX, RF, Volte, and 2, 3, or 4G mobile telephone 
networks [30, 47, 49]. Wireless body area networks 
function in either a one-hop or two-hop star topology 
[35]. Table 1 – IEEE 802.15.6 Communication 
describes the various communication channels laid out 
by IEEE 802.15.6.  
The IEEE 802.15.6 standard identifies a security 
paradigm for wireless body area networks that defines 
three levels of security [37]: 
1. Unsecured Communication - Data transmitted in 
unsecured frames. Provides no measure for 
integrity, validation, authenticity, replay defense, 
privacy, and confidentiality. 
2. Authentication/ no Encryption- Data that is 
transmitted is authenticated but not encrypted. 
3. Authentication/ Encryption- Data transmitted is 
authenticated and encrypted. 
All devices in a wireless body area network fall into 
one of these three categories.  
     A significant amount of research has been 
conducted on attack graphs and risks to medical 
devices and body area networks. This research 
suggests combining the two to assess risk to 
ambulatory medical devices and form mitigation 
strategies. 
 
3. Data and Model  
 
In order to display the use of attack graphs and 
form mitigation strategies, this research uses a model 
of a theoretical ambulatory device as seen in Figure 1 – 
Hypothetical Wireless body Network. The model is 
referred to as theoretical because it is currently in 
production and, therefore, not yet available for proper 
testing. The device is a wireless body network that 
consist of three sensors. Two sensors are worn on the 
head and one sensor is worn on the chest. These types 
of sensors are commercially available, and capable of 
monitoring various biological data, including heart 
rate, EEG signals, or body temperature. The sensors 
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communicate through a wireless signal to a cellular 
smart phone which runs an application that processes, 
analyzes, and stores the data. 
 
Table 2. Bluetooth Attacks and Mitigation 
Author Attack Mitigation Strategy 
Padgette / 
Minar [41]  
[24] 
Capture 
Bluetooth 
device address 
Set device to lowest 
power level 
Minar [24]  BluePrinting Keep device address 
secret 
Minar  
[24] 
Reflection 
attack 
Use encryption, Keep 
device address secret 
Padgette 
[41] 
Repeatable 
authentication 
attempts 
Limit authentication 
request, Set device to 
lowest power  
Minar [24] Blueover  Keep device address 
secret 
Padgette 
[41] 
Static SSP pass 
keys 
Random, passkeys at 
each pairing 
Padgette / 
Minar [41] 
[24] 
Encryption key 
negotiable. 
Full 128 bit key, 
establish min key size 
Padgette  / 
Dardanelli  
[41] 
No 
authentication  
Application level 
security 
Minar  / 
Panse  
[24] [25] 
Bluesnarfing non-discover mode 
Minar  / 
Panse  
[24] [25] 
Pin Cracking Use random long pin 
codes 
Minar  
[24] 
MIM/Imperson
ation Attack 
Link encryption, Link 
keys  based on 
combination keys,   
Security mode 3, Set 
device to lowest power  
Minar  
[24] 
Pairing 
Eavesdropping 
Pair as little as possible, 
Link encryption, Set 
device to lowest power  
 
The application allocates a specific amount of 
memory for data storage and uploads the data to cloud 
storage when needed. Doctors have access to the cloud 
storage for data analysis. The application analyzes the 
data and, if an anomaly occurs, it sends a text message 
to the patient and patient’s emergency contact as well 
as an email to the patient’s doctor. Due to industry 
popularity [1], the scope of this research focuses on a 
smartphone running an Android Operating System that 
utilizes Bluetooth to communicate with the sensors. 
Bluetooth is a short range (10-100m) low power 
wireless technology that operates from 2.4 to 2.4835 
GHz at a data rate of 1, 2, or 3 Mbps [6]. Three basic 
security services provided in the Bluetooth standard 
and identified in a  National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) guide include authentication, 
confidentiality and authorization [41]. The report 
defines authentication as the ability to identify 
communicating devices through a unique device 
address. The report notes that the Bluetooth standard 
does not support user authentication natively. 
Confidentiality focuses on averting the compromise of 
information by ensuring that only authorized devices 
have access to transmitted data. Authorization 
concentrates on resource governance based on device 
authorization prior to sanctioning interaction. 
In general, Bluetooth security threats can be 
grouped into three categories that include disclosure, 
integrity and denial. A disclosure threat occurs when 
information is leaked from the system, an integrity 
threat is when an attacker deliberately alters data to 
fool the receiver and a denial of service threat occurs 
when an attacker is able to limit a user’s access to a 
device or application [57]. This research focuses on 
data acquisition and/or manipulation. A literature 
review was performed to identify appropriate attack 
strategies on individual vectors in the theoretical 
model. Table 2 – Bluetooth Attacks and Mitigation 
summarizes attacks and provides mitigation strategies 
when available on Bluetooth enabled devices, and 
Table 3 – Android Attacks and Mitigation provides 
attacks and mitigation strategies on devices running an 
Android operating system. In both tables the first 
column lists the author and reference. The second 
column gives the title or style of an attack and the last 
column provides a of list possible mitigation strategies. 
This research assumes attackers are capable enough 
to acquire information regarding communication 
frequency and modulation. This information is, 
generally, easily found in an online copy of a device’s 
user manual or by searching for the specific device on 
the Federal Communication Commission website. 
Therefore, the reconnaissance steps are omitted in the 
model.  
                 
Table 3. Android Attacks and Mitigation 
Author Attack Mitigation 
Strategy 
Vidas  [29] Physical Attack User Authentication  
Vidas  / Enck  
[29] [21] 
Permission 
Model Attack 
App certified 
Chen  [8] UI State 
Inference 
Attacks 
File System Access 
Control, Buffer 
Reuse 
Noor  [17] Man In The 
Middle 
Encryption, No 
default password 
Oli  [11] General No automatic 
connection to Wi-Fi, 
Disable Wi-Fi when 
not in use 
Dondyk [65] Denial of 
Service 
Disable Wi-Fi when 
not in use 
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4. Attack Graphs  
 
 
Figure 2. Attack Graph 
 
An inherent difficulty with attack graph modeling 
is assigning weights to the edges of the graph [45]. 
Specifically, what method does one us to assign a 
numerical value to an attack that cannot be 
quantitatively assessed? This research presents an 
alternative approach to assigning weights to links in 
the graph. The graph, as seen in Figure 2 - Bluetooth 
Attack Graph, assigns a numerical value to nodes. This 
value represents the likelihood of achieving success in 
a given node. By adding the value of each node in the 
path and dividing by the number of nodes traversed in 
the path, an ‘average’ risk is assigned for the attack. 
Node risks are assigned based on the following 
concepts: 
1. Monotonicity as stated by Amman et al “means 
that no action an attacker takes interferes with the 
attacker’s ability to take any other action” [52]. 
Hence, any calculations derived from the attacks 
must consider all attack vectors.  
2. The frequency concept simply means that 
increased recurrence is displayed via increased 
node weight [45]. Nodes that are visited more 
often are given higher risk. This is not because it is 
easily achieved, but because it is a vital step to 
many different attacks. 
3. Complexity refers to the difficulty of an attack. 
For example, BlueSnarfing is described in 
literature as “the software tools required to steal 
information from Bluetooth enabled mobile 
phones (that) are widely available in the Web” 
[24], therefore an “equipment” node would be 
assigned a higher weight because it is easily 
achieved. 
Figure 2 is an example attack graph on the 
theoretical device. Here, the goal of the attacker is data 
acquisition. Blueover is an attack used to acquire 
sensitive or private data from a mobile device equipped 
with Bluetooth. Reflection attacks are a type of ‘man in 
the middle attack’ against Bluetooth enabled devices.  
‘Access AT Comm’ refers to an attacker having access 
to the address translation command. ‘Get Dev Address’ 
refers to the ability to get the Bluetooth device address, 
and ‘No Encryption’ means the communication 
between devices is not encrypted. ‘AT Set Available’ 
means the mode of address translation command is set 
to available. Finally, physical refers to an attack where 
an attacker gets physical access to a device, and social 
engineering is when the attacker uses methods such as 
phishing to get the needed information. Attacks were 
selected from those in tables 2 and 3. 
The attack graph depicted in Figure 2 highlights 
two types of attacks, Blueover and reflection. Blueover 
requires two initial steps for success. The first is ‘Get 
Device Address’, and the second is ‘Access AT 
Comm’. The symbol on the graph connecting the two 
links is an ‘And’ symbol, which means both must be 
achieved. The next step for ‘Access AT Comm’ is ‘AT 
set Available’, which means the mode of the address 
translation must be set too available.  
The next step requires either a physical attack or 
social engineering to achieve the goal of data 
acquisition. The two initial steps for a reflection attack 
are ‘Get Device Address’ and ‘No Encryption’. Once 
this has taken place, either a physical attack or a social 
engineering attack can be instigated. 
By modeling attacks in this manner, it is easy to 
identify the most important security issues. For 
example, most paths eventually go through social 
engineering or physical nodes as depicted in Figure 2. 
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For the purposes of this discussion, the attack nodes 
illustrated in Figure 2 are considered a moderate risk. 
While the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)  
suggests actions that manufacturers should consider in 
order to secure medical devices such as "Limiting 
access to devices to trusted users through the use of 
authentication, such as ID and password, smart card 
and biometrics, including multi-layered authentication" 
[13], the guidance is only a recommendation and does 
not establish legally enforceable responsibilities.  
It is reasonable to assume administrators will 
attempt to hold medical devices, which reside in a 
hospital setting, to the guidelines that are set forth by 
the FDA. However, such an assumption should not be 
made for third party software that runs on devices such 
as mobile phones.  
Another consideration is that ambulatory devices 
could have suggested authentication protocols; 
however, there is no guarantee that users who do not 
understand the possible risk will enable authentication, 
or use reasonable passwords to protect devices. Since 
these risk are considered moderate, it would be a good 
idea to educate patients on the dangers associated with 
these types of attacks along with how to avoid them. 
Another node frequently visited is ‘Get Dev Add’, 
which stands for Get the Bluetooth Device Address. 
Hence, it would be a good idea for patients to ensure 
that the Bluetooth Device Address stays concealed.  
Table 4 - Blueover Possible Paths presents a list of 
the possible attack paths for a Blueover attack. The 
table only depicts attacks that could lead to success. 
For example, both ‘Access AT Command’ and ‘Get 
Device Address’ must be achieved. In any case where 
one of these attacks fails, the probability of success is 
zero. Therefore, those attacks are not listed. This 
indicates that mitigation strategies relating to those 
nodes should be top priority. An analysis of the table 
data indicates that the probability of the success of an 
attack is reduced or increased by removing the threat to 
any individual node corresponding to an ‘or’ gate.  
The logic for Tables 4 and 5 are derived via the 
following calculation. Each row in the table has an S 
followed by a number. The S stands for success while 
the number is the assigned weight from the node. If all 
of the attacks are successful, the weighted impact totals 
eight. If an attack is not achieved, the S is turned into 
an F (for failure) and the weight is assigned a zero to 
reduce the likelihood of achieving the overall attack 
goal. The total possible value in both tables is eight. 
This value represents the value of treating every node 
as a success and summing the values. The probabilities 
between the tables appear to correspond, but table 5 
has one less intermittent step (‘AT Set Available’). 
 
 
Table 4. Blueover Possible Paths 
Access 
AT 
Comm 
Get 
Dev 
Add 
AT 
Set 
Aval 
P Soc Norm Goal  
S-1 S-2 S-2 S-1 S-2 8/8 100% 
S-1 S-2 S-2 S-1 F-0 6/8 75% 
S-1 S-2 S-2 F-0 S-2 7/8 87% 
S-1 S-2 F-0 S-1 S-2 6/8 75% 
S-1 S-2 F-0 S-1 F-0 4/8 50% 
S-1 S-2 F-0 F-0 S-2 5/8 63% 
Key: S=Success, F=Failure, P=Physical Attack, Soc= 
Social Engineering, Norm=Actual/Potential, Goal= 
Probability of success if given steps are achieved. 
 
Table 5 - Reflection Attack Possible Paths shows 
the possible attack paths for a Reflection attack. Again, 
‘No Encryption’ and ‘Get Device Address’ are both 
required for success, so only paths with attacks that are 
successful are shown. The evaluation of this table 
indicates that social engineering attacks should be 
addressed before physical attacks. This is due to a 
higher probability of achieving the attack goal is higher 
for social engineering versus a physical attack. 
Viewing both tables together gives further insight 
into common attack vectors. For example, the node 
‘Get Device Address’ is required in both attacks. ‘Get 
Device Address’ refers to the ability to get the 
Bluetooth device address. Since this attack goal is 
pursued in two different attack types, all Bluetooth 
device users should take steps to keep device addresses 
secret. Evaluations should also take into account the 
attack paths. 
 
Table 5. Reflection Attack Possible Paths 
No  
Encryption 
Get 
Dev 
Add. 
P Soc Norm Goal  
S-3 S-2 S-1 S-2 8/8 100% 
S-3 S-2 S-1 F-0 6/8 75% 
S-3 S-2 F-0 S-2 7/8 87% 
Key: S=Success, F=Failure, P=Physical Attack, Soc= 
Social Engineering, Norm=Actual/Potential, Goal= 
Probability of success if given steps are achieved. 
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 Reviewers should consider the number of steps in 
a path. In most cases one would assume a shorter path 
is easier to achieve. However, the correspondence 
between the probabilities on the tables for particular 
paths is also due to the ‘No Encryption’ node. The ‘No 
Encryption’ node has a very high risk value, which 
offsets the fact that the attack has fewer steps. In any 
case, producing attack graphs and the corresponding 
attack path tables provides detailed insight on the 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation strategies within 
a system. 
These models highlight the need to assess risk to 
ambulatory medical devices independently of 
traditional medical devices. Vulnerabilities such as 
physical access and social engineering would have less 
probability of success for traditional medical devices 
for various reasons.  Traditional devices in a hospital 
setting are generally monitored by the hospital staff, 
making the success of a physical attack less likely. 
Hospital personnel receive training on the use and 
maintenance of medical devices, making them less 
likely to fall victim to a social engineering attack. 
Devices in hospital settings are generally ‘hard wired’ 
or they are on a private network. In addition, many 
devices use proprietary software. This makes threats 
such as ‘Access AT Comm’ less likely, if not 
impossible. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
Ambulatory medical devices offer a viable 
alternative for patients who require constant 
monitoring. These devices provide a means for 
administering medication, monitoring vital signs, and 
improving a patient’s overall quality of life. However, 
as with any technology, it is important to understand 
the risk associated with the use of these devices. This is 
especially important for ambulatory medical devices, 
which can have direct or indirect impact on a patient’s 
health and wellbeing.  
Attack graphs offer a visual approach to identifying 
risk within complex systems. The steps required to 
achieve an attack are easily identifiable using this 
approach. Hence, the identification of attacks aids 
designers in developing mitigation strategies to prevent 
the successful execution of an attack.  
This research demonstrates attack graph modeling 
on a theoretical ambulatory medical device. The 
theoretical device contains components and software 
that is common among ambulatory devices today. This 
research highlights the need to model ambulatory 
devices separately from traditional medical devices by 
demonstrating certain attack vectors that pose greater 
risk to ambulatory devices, such as physical attacks 
and social engineering. To our knowledge, this is the 
first time attack graph modeling has been used for 
ambulatory medical devices. 
Additional future work will consider the 
architecture of the attack graph. In this research, 
weights were assigned to the nodes of the graph. 
Future work will examine the impact of assigning 
weights to the links between nodes along with 
developing combined weighting systems in order to 
identify which style of attack graph is the most 
appropriate for ambulatory medical devices. Once 
modeling is complete, mitigation strategies will be 
identified and tested.  
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